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We use panel data on ISO 9000 quality certification in 85 
countries between 1993 and 1998 to better understand 
the cross-national diffusion of an organizational practice. 
Following neoinstitutional theory, we focus on the coer- 
cive, normative, and mimetic effects that result from the 
exposure of firms in a given country to a powerful source 
of critical resources, a common pool of relevant technical 
knowledge, and the experiences of firms located in other 
countries. We use social network theory to develop a sys- 
tematic conceptual understanding of how firms located in 
different countries influence each other's rates of adop- 
tion as a result of cohesive and equivalent network rela- 
tionships. Regression results provide support for our pre- 
dictions that states and foreign multinationals are the key 
actors responsible for coercive isomorphism, cohesive 
trade relationships between countries generate coercive 
and normative effects, and role-equivalent trade relation- 
ships result in learning-based and competitive imitation.? 
Organizational practices tend to diffuse unevenly throughout 
the world. Using comparative case studies of a small number 
of countries, researchers have found that national institutions 
shape processes of diffusion above and beyond the technical 
characteristics or efficiency of the practice (Cole, 1985, 1989; 
Gooderham, Nordhaug, and Ringdal, 1999; Guillen, 1994a; 
Orru, Biggart, and Hamilton, 1991). These differences in the 
rates of international diffusion of organizational practices have 
not been conceptually and empirically examined for a suffi- 
ciently large number of countries in order to understand the 
drivers of diffusion on a truly global scale. 
The question of how practices travel from one organization or 
social setting to another has already been of interest to a 
variety of fields in the social sciences, the life sciences, and 
engineering (see Rogers, 1995 for a review) and, with the 
intensification of globalization has become even more urgent 
to answer (Guillen, 2001; Meyer, Boli, and Ramirez, 1997). 
Some researchers have focused on the technical merits of 
the practice or innovation in accounting for diffusion (e.g., 
Mansfield, 1961; Williamson, 1970; Davies, 1979), while oth- 
ers have examined the existence of institutional effects on 
the diffusion of practices in single industries, fields, sectors, 
or countries, usually the United States (e.g., Baron, Dobbin, 
and Jennings, 1986; Galaskiewicz and Wasserman, 1989; 
Davis, 1991; Galaskiewicz and Burt, 1991; Haunschild, 1993; 
Haveman, 1993; Davis and Greve, 1997). This line of 
research has established that practices spread from one 
organization to another following a process of institutionaliza- 
tion driven by resource dependence, social comparison, or 
network ties linking potential adopters, but most work has 
not focused on diffusion to different organizations across 
countries. 
Previous research has paid attention to the effects of national 
institutions and forces on the process of diffusion of certain 
organizational practices within countries (e.g., Kieser, 1989; 
Barley and Kunda, 1992; Lazerson, 1995; Abrahamson and 
Fairchild, 1999). But neoinstitutional theorists have explicitly 
argued that isomorphism occurs at the country level of analy- 
sis as well as at the level of the organizational field or the 
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industry (Jepperson and Meyer, 1991; Orru, Biggart, and 
Hamilton, 1991; Rosenzweig and Singh, 1991; Kostova, 
1999). A few researchers have more specifically considered 
the institutional factors that shape the cross-national diffusion 
of practices, focusing on state structures, professionalization, 
and culture as explanations (e.g., Guillen, 1994a, 1997; 
Meyer et al., 1997; Westney, 1987). 
Most empirical research on cross-national diffusion falls 
under two rather restrictive categories. The first comprises 
comparative studies based on a limited number of countries, 
including Cole's (1985, 1989) analysis of the diffusion of 
small-group activities in Japan, Sweden, and the United 
States; Gooderham, Nordhaug, and Ringdal's (1999) compari- 
son of the adoption of human resource management prac- 
tices by firms in six European countries; and Casper and 
Hancke's (1999) study of the implementation of quality man- 
agement practices by automobile firms in France and Ger- 
many. The second category of empirical research on cross- 
national diffusion includes studies based on evidence drawn 
from a large number of countries, but dealing with practices 
adopted by governments or nation-states as opposed to by 
organizations or firms. For instance, cross-national processes 
of institutional isomorphism have been empirically document- 
ed in the cases of the spread of oil nationalizations (Kobrin, 
1985), decolonization (Strang, 1990), currency crises (Glick 
and Rose, 1999), and policies to protect the environment 
(Frank, Hironaka, and Schofer, 2000). The empirical literature 
does not contain analyses of diffusion of an organizational 
practice among firms located in a large number of countries, 
even though such diffusion is likely to be a powerful force in 
a globalized economy. Moreover, the literature on cross- 
national diffusion has made very limited progress in terms of 
specifying the institutional mechanisms that facilitate or 
impede acceptance of a given organizational practice interna- 
tionally. In this paper, we fill this gap as we identify, concep- 
tualize, measure, and test the effects of the institutional 
forces that produce isomorphic behavior among firms located 
in different countries. We provide the first empirical test of 
the cross-national diffusion of an organizational practice (ISO 
9000 quality certification) based on 85 countries over a six- 
year period. 
THE DIFFUSION OF ISO 9000 QUALITY CERTIFICATION 
Quality certification has emerged as a key organizational prac- 
tice helping companies worldwide establish rationalized pro- 
duction processes. As such, it provides an appropriate mpiri- 
cal setting for the study of the cross-national diffusion of 
organizational practices. The most influential and pervasive 
quality practice in the world is associated with the 9000 fami- 
ly of certificates sponsored by the International Organization 
for Standardization (ISO), based in Geneva, Switzerland. ISO's 
goal is to "promote the development of standardization and 
related activities in the world with a view to facilitating inter- 
national exchange of goods and services, and to developing 
cooperation in the spheres of intellectual, scientific, techno- 
logical and economic activity" (ISO, 2001a). To understand 
the diffusion of ISO standards, some background information 
is necessary. 
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Spread of ISO 9000 
The ISO 9000 standards were developed by Technical Com- 
mittee ISO/TC 176, which comprises experts from business 
and other organizations around the world (ISO, 1998). The 
first ISO 9000 certificates, attesting that firms were adhering 
to standards, were issued in 1987 (ISO, 2001 b). By the end 
of 1999, more than 400,000 ISO certificates had been issued 
to firms in 158 different countries and territories, up from 
27,000 certificates in 48 countries in 1993. Having originated 
in Europe, the ISO standards first diffused among firms in 
the member countries of the European Union (EU), with the 
United Kingdom in particular playing an important role in this 
development and diffusion. The ISO 9000 standards were ini- 
tially based on the BS5750 series of quality assurance sys- 
tem standards developed by the British Standards Institution 
(BSI) in 1979 (Peach, 1997). When the first ISO 9000 certifi- 
cates were issued in 1987, there were already about 6,000 
BS5750 certificates in Britain (Abdul-Aziz, Chan, and Met- 
calfe, 2000). With the support of the British government, BSI 
played an active role in increasing ISO 9000 certification in 
many countries around the world, an increase that was fur- 
ther reinforced when the EU recognized ISO 9000 certifi- 
cates as part of its harmonization effort (Peach, 1997; Ander- 
son, Daly, and Johnson, 1999). In recent years, certification 
has gradually diffused to other countries in the world. While 
European certificates comprised 83 percent of all certificates 
in the world in 1995, the proportion had come down to 54 
percent by 2000 (ISO, 2001 b). Moreover, while the early cer- 
tificates were mostly issued to manufacturing firms, the stan- 
dards have diffused in many other areas, including service 
sectors, such as information technology, education, and 
health and social work (ISO, 2001 b). 
ISO 9000 norms were developed as a set of international 
standards and guidelines that serve as the basis for establish- 
ing quality management systems at manufacturing and ser- 
vice firms (ISO, 1998). Certification is voluntary and is under- 
taken by various certification bodies called "registrars." 
Registrars include government laboratories, private testing 
organizations, firms that were early adopters of ISO, industry 
trade groups, and accounting firms (Anderson, Daly, and 
Johnson, 1999). Registrars, in turn, are qualified to conduct 
audits and award certificates by national accrediting agencies, 
which typically are the national standards body in each 
country. 
ISO 9000 certificates are not awarded to products or ser- 
vices, but to quality processes within the organization. As 
such, certification does not concern the quality of the final 
products or services. Certification requires detailed review 
and documentation of the organization's production process- 
es, in accordance with the quality system requirements spec- 
ified by ISO. The requirements span areas such as contract 
review, design control, document and data control, purchas- 
ing, production, installation, servicing, and inspection. The 
organization prepares the documentation on its quality policy 
statement and on the purpose, scope, content, and proce- 
dure for each activity in a quality manual (Docking and 
Dowen, 1999). An accredited third-party registrar then audits 
the documentation and implementation. Organizations that 
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demonstrate conformity to the standards receive a certificate 
and can publicize in promotions or advertisements that their 
systems and organizational processes are "ISO 9000-certi- 
fied." The certificate is typically awarded for a period of three 
years. Regular audits are conducted after awarding a certifi- 
cate to make sure that the firm is in compliance with the 
standards. Hence, organizations must engage in a continuous 
effort to remain certified. 
Registration, the process of certification, can take anywhere 
from nine months to over two years. The costs of this 
process, apart from development and implementation of the 
management system, include application and document 
review, the registrar's visits and assessments, issuing the 
registration and writing the report, and any follow-up visits 
(Peach, 1997). The average cost of certification to the firm is 
about $187,000 (1996 figures), ranging between $50,000 and 
several million dollars, depending on the size and complexity 
of the production process (Anderson, Daly, and Johnson, 
1999; Docking and Dowen, 1999). 
The technical literature reports mixed results as to the techni- 
cal benefits of compliance with the standards. On the one 
hand, ISO certification reportedly helps companies improve 
their information gathering and analysis, human resource 
development, supplier and customer relations, and overall 
quality levels (Rao, Ragu-Nathan, and Soils, 1997). On the 
other, the effectiveness of compliance has been questioned 
by other studies showing that certification does not result in 
buyers perceiving that products are of higher quality (Guerin 
and Rice, 1996), improved customer satisfaction (Terziovski, 
Samson, and Dow, 1995), or better operational performance 
and foreign sales (Simmons and White, 1999). 
The costly process of registration and the mixed evidence 
concerning the benefits of certification suggest that the 
widespread diffusion of ISO 9000 certification might be 
affected by institutional factors beyond technical or efficiency 
concerns, as has been reported in several previous studies of 
the diffusion of quality practices. At the organizational level, 
Zbaracki (1998) described the process through which total 
quality management (TOM) practices became institutionalized 
(see also Hackman and Wageman, 1995). At the national 
level, Abrahamson and Fairchild (1999) studied how Japanese 
quality control practices affected managerial discourse in the 
United States. The only large-sample study at the firm level- 
using a sample of 514 ISO adopters and 1,965 non-adopters 
in the U.S. and Canada-concluded that industry and product 
regulation, customer requirements, and previous adoption of 
TQM was associated with ISO certification (Anderson, Daly, 
and Johnson, 1999). The importance of institutions in the 
adoption of ISO 9000 certification has been reported in a 
study of German organizations by Walgenbach and Beck 
(2000) and in a comparative study of the German and French 
automobile industries by Casper and Hancke (1999). But 
these studies have not examined the impact of institutional 
factors on the worldwide diffusion of quality certification. 
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Spread of ISO 9000 
Institutional Factors in Diffusion 
The diffusion of innovations has received attention from 
scholars in sociology, economics, marketing, communication 
studies, and organizational theory (Rogers, 1995). Models of 
aggregate processes of diffusion over time have generated 
two widely accepted insights (Mahajan and Peterson, 1985; 
Mahajan, Muller, and Bass, 1990). First, the cumulative adop- 
tion of an innovation over time follows an S-shaped or sig- 
moid curve (Bass, 1969). The S curve reflects the fact that 
relatively few members of a social system adopt an innova- 
tion during the early stages. Over time, the rate of adoption 
of the innovation increases, until the process gets closer to 
saturation, when the rate again slows down. Second, the 
process of adoption is affected by influences both external 
and internal to the system. The mixed-influence model posits 
that actors external to the social system are important in the 
introduction of the innovation to the system, whereas the 
internal influence of members upon each other triggers 
increasing diffusion (Mahajan and Peterson, 1985; Abraham- 
son and Rosenkopf, 1997). 
Institutional theorists ask why the S-shaped pattern occurs 
and why some members of the social system adopt earlier 
than others. Scholars have attempted to uncover those 
mechanisms that trigger internal and external influences dri- 
ving adoption decisions over and above the technical efficien- 
cy of the innovation. In particular, according to the new insti- 
tutionalism in organizational analysis, the adoption and 
implementation of organizational ideas and practices takes 
place in a taken-for-granted (i.e., institutionalized) social and 
cultural context, which is different from the technical environ- 
ment (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Meyer and Scott, 1983; 
Scott, 1983; Zucker, 1987; Powell, 1988). While the technical 
context rewards organizations for effective and efficient con- 
trol of the work process, the institutional context creates 
imperatives for conformity in order to gain legitimacy (Meyer 
and Rowan, 1977; Meyer and Scott, 1983). It is important to 
note that a single organization is often subject to pressures 
from both technical and institutional environments to become 
increasingly similar to other organizations perceived as being 
its peers, possessing certain desirable features, or being suc- 
cessful (Haunschild and Miner, 1997; Scott, 1987; Suchman, 
1995; Zucker, 1987). 
There are several mechanisms through which organizations 
become more similar. A widely accepted idea is that organi- 
zations become more like each other as a result of coercive, 
normative, and mimetic pressures (DiMaggio and Powell, 
1983). These three mechanisms of isomorphism operate 
through the agency of influential (generally large and/or suc- 
cessful) organizations or the knowledge-bearing professions 
and because of contact diffusion through networks of ties 
linking adopters to non-adopters (Miner and Haunschild, 
1995; Abrahamson and Rosenkopf, 1997). Institutional 
researchers agree that the study of diffusion, whether within 
or across countries, requires identifying and measuring those 
agents and channels of diffusion that account for the increas- 
ing isomorphism observed in the world of organizations, one 
of which is resource dependence. 
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Resource-dependence as a source of coercive isomor- 
phism. Coercive isomorphism refers to the homogeneity 
pressures stemming from political influence. Pressures origi- 
nating from the state and other powerful organizations are 
the most direct mechanism of institutional diffusion based on 
coercion (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). As predicted by 
resource-dependence and power theories (Perrow, 1986; 
Palmer, Jennings, and Zhou, 1993), dependent organizations 
are likely to adopt patterns of behavior sanctioned by the 
organizations that control critical resources. 
As nation-states gain dominance, pressures of conformity to 
rules institutionalized and legitimated by the state also 
increase (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Jepperson and Meyer, 
1991). Research has documented that states are key in the 
diffusion of new practices borrowed from other countries 
(Westney, 1987; Guillen, 1994a, 1994b; Arias and Guillen, 
1998). For instance, Cole (1985, 1989) described how the 
Japanese state played a prominent role in the diffusion of the 
quality movement. States may provide incentives (or imple- 
ment sanctions) for organizational transformation. In addition, 
as consumers of goods and services, states may exert coer- 
cive pressures by asking suppliers and contractors to con- 
form to certain procedures and standards. The state's role in 
imposing the adoption of certain organizational practices has 
been reported in a variety of settings, ranging from civil 
administration reform (Tolbert and Zucker, 1983) to labor and 
human resource management practices (Baron, Dobbin, and 
Jennings, 1986; Baron, Jennings, and Dobbin, 1988). 
In the case of ISO 9000, the initial thrust for the development 
of ISO standards and certification came from the energy, 
defense, and telecommunications equipment industries, in 
which the state is either a customer or a producer, or both 
(Conti, 1999). As discussed earlier, the European Union (EU) 
played an important role in the acceptance of ISO 9000 stan- 
dards. On the road to the 1992 single-market project, the EU 
(then known as the EC) adopted ISO 9000 as part of its con- 
formity assessment plan to establish uniform systems for 
product and quality systems certification (Peach, 1997: 19). 
As a result of EU directives requiring quality system registra- 
tion, ISO 9000 has become an imperative for many business- 
es in Europe, as well as those hoping to work with European 
firms. 
In time, many government agencies in countries around the 
world have come to require their contractors to be ISO-9000- 
certified (Balasoglou, 1994; Orsini, 1995; Rao, Ragu-Nathan, 
and Solis, 1997; Dissanayaka et al., 2001). Over a hundred 
countries have adopted ISO as a national quality assurance 
standard. In the United States, the Departments of Defense 
and Energy, the Food and Drug Administration, the Federal 
Aviation Administration, and the NASA decided to accept ISO 
certification for its suppliers during the mid 1990s (Hockman, 
1992; Machine Design, 1994; Anderson, Daly, and Johnson, 
1999). 
Multinational enterprises are a second influential type of 
organization that may cause coercive isomorphism. Enterpris- 
es with operations in more than one country are widely rec- 
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Spread of ISO 9000 
ognized as key agents in the diffusion of practices across 
national borders because they transfer organizational tech- 
niques to subsidiaries and to other organizations in the for- 
eign host countries in which they operate (Vernon, 1979; 
Kim, 1991; Kobrin, 1991; Westney, 1993; Arias and Guillen, 
1998). Manufacturing and retailing multinationals are increas- 
ingly relying on global networks of suppliers (Gereffi, 1993). 
Like the state, multinationals operate following certain proce- 
dures and standards that suppliers must meet. 
There is considerable evidence that multinationals prefer ISO- 
9000-certified suppliers when they locate production plants in 
a foreign country. In Singapore, local suppliers have had to 
"respond to requests for third-party certification from large 
locally-based multinational companies" (Huat, 1992: 1). Multi- 
nationals such as DuPont and De Beers are reported to pre- 
fer supplies from ISO-9000-certified firms (Cullingworth, 
1992; Hockman, 1992). More than half of large firms sur- 
veyed in 1991 in the Netherlands, Germany, Greece, Spain, 
and Switzerland required ISO-9000-certified supplies (ISO 
9000 News, 1992). More recently, some European and Amer- 
ican multinationals have proposed asking their suppliers 
themselves to report their compliance with ISO 9000, rather 
than requiring certification (Zuckerman, 1998, 1999). Multina- 
tionals such as Hewlett-Packard, Motorola, Xerox, and the 
Big Three automakers use ISO-based criteria to certify their 
own suppliers and have aligned their internal quality systems 
with ISO guidelines (Avery, 1995; Quality, 1994, 1995; Pur- 
chasing, 1996). Even if multinationals circumvent the formal 
ISO certification process, however, suppliers will likely have 
an incentive to seek ISO certification through a national quali- 
ty association in order to sell to other multinationals. 
As large organizations that are engaged in transactions with 
hundreds, even thousands of suppliers, states and multina- 
tionals contribute to the rationalization and normalization of 
production processes throughout the economy. States and 
multinational firms will be more influential in diffusing prac- 
tices or standards to the extent that they have a strong pres- 
ence in the economy as purchasers of goods or services. We 
expect that firms in countries more exposed to the activity of 
the state and of the multinationals hould be more likely to 
pursue and obtain quality certification: 
Hypothesis 1 (H1): The greater the presence of coercive organiza- 
tions such as the state or foreign multinationals in the economy, the 
greater the number of ISO 9000 certificates. 
Knowledge and professionalization as sources of norma- 
tive isomorphism. The second fundamental institutional 
mechanism of diffusion has to do with normative effects that 
compel organizations to adopt an innovation (DiMaggio and 
Powell, 1983; Guillen, 1998), including the formal training of 
the organization's employees or of its technical personnel and 
managers, can increase the likelihood that practices consis- 
tent with that training are adopted. Formal training and pro- 
fessionalization create an institutional environment through 
shared social rules (Meyer and Rowan, 1977). Members of a 
profession or occupational community share a common 
understanding and knowledge base. At the organizational 
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level, research has supported the existence of normative 
pressures to adopt similar practices resulting from profes- 
sionalization and knowledge (e.g., Galaskiewicz, 1985; 
Galaskiewicz and Wasserman, 1989; Burns and Wholey, 
1993). At the international level, we expect a similar effect, 
especially because professional training and knowledge are 
often standardized globally rather than nationally, creating a 
channel for diffusion across countries (Meyer et al., 1997; 
Arias and Guillen, 1998). Still, countries differ in the extent to 
which professionalization and technical knowledge have 
developed, with distinctive consequences for organizational 
isomorphism (Guillen, 1994a, 1994b). 
The adoption of ISO certification, like other quality and organi- 
zational practices, depends on the availability of knowledge 
about production management and of professional personnel 
with a technical background. The early diffusion of ISO 9000 
in manufacturing occurred through the work of engineers and 
production managers. Moreover, individuals with scientific or 
engineering backgrounds tend to find it easier to access the 
technical aspects of quality standards, such as the use of sta- 
tistical control tools (Zbaracki, 1998). Cole (1985, 1989) 
reported a connection between the existence of technical 
knowledge in the areas of quality and production manage- 
ment and the strength of the quality assurance movement in 
Sweden, Japan, and the United States. We therefore predict: 
Hypothesis 2 (H2): The greater the country's knowledge base in the 
areas of quality and production management, the greater the num- 
ber of ISO 9000 certificates. 
Cohesion in networks as a source of isomorphism. Anoth- 
er normative effect has to do with isomorphism due to cohe- 
sive relationships. Organizations observe each other to under- 
stand what practices are effective and acceptable in their 
social system. Therefore, normative institutional isomorphism 
follows a logic of appropriateness. As the number of organi- 
zations adopting an innovation increases, the innovation 
becomes institutionalized. In addition, institutional mimicry is 
more likely to arise under conditions of uncertainty, i.e., when 
the innovation is poorly understood, and the efficiency bene- 
fits of adoption are not clear (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). It 
is reasonable to expect norm-based institutional pressures to 
prevail at the international evel as well. Institutional theorists 
have argued that mimetic processes lead to the acceptance 
of similar practices around the world and that administrative 
form and the economic organization of countries are subject 
to isomorphic processes (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Jep- 
person and Meyer, 1991). 
An important issue in the analysis of institutional mimicry is 
identifying whom the focal actor is likely to observe and imi- 
tate, by specifying the boundaries of the relevant social sys- 
tem. Institutional theory posits that the diffusion of norms 
tends to involve actors that are perceived to be peers. 
Hence, many empirical studies of institutional isomorphism 
have drawn the boundaries of the social system by reference 
to similarity in terms of organizational characteristics such as 
size or age (e.g., Schoonhoven, Eisenhardt, and Lyman, 1990; 
Haveman, 1993), membership in the same industry (Fligstein, 
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1985), or geographic region (Burns and Wholey, 1993). The 
implicit or explicit assumption in these studies is that mem- 
bers sharing similar traits or located similarly become aware 
of each other's activities and use this information to compare 
their practices with others. Several institutional theorists 
(e.g., DiMaggio and Powell, 1983, Zucker, 1987), as well as 
network theorists (Burt, 1987; Marsden and Friedkin, 1993), 
have pointed out that network ties may determine whom 
actors observe and imitate and, hence, act as channels of 
normative isomorphism between actors. 
Many diffusion studies have examined cohesion between 
actors as a normative source of imitative behavior. The basic 
social cohesion argument revolves around the notion that 
actors tied to each other share a culture or set of norms that 
invites them to behave similarly; cohesive actors influence 
each other and hence tend to adopt similar patterns of 
behavior (Durkheim, 1951, 1984; Coleman, 1988). Empirical 
studies have shown that diffusion occurs through direct ties 
between actors. For instance, interlocking directorates linking 
firms have been reported to contribute to the spread of cor- 
porate acquisitions (Haunschild, 1993), poison pills (Davis, 
1991), golden parachutes (Davis and Greve, 1997), and tech- 
nological innovations (Ahuja, 2000). Westphal, Gulati, and 
Shortell (1997) suggested that the adoption of TQM by U.S. 
hospitals was influenced by institutional mimicry resulting 
from direct ties, especially at the later stages of adoption. 
Galaskiewicz and Wasserman (1989) suggested that norma- 
tive pressures for similarity occur between organizations tied 
through boundary spanning personnel. Palmer, Jennings, and 
Zhou (1993) argued that normative effects transmitted by 
personal contacts of chief executive officers and interlocking 
directorates increased the likelihood of adoption of the multi- 
divisional form by large U.S. corporations. A study of the dif- 
fusion of matrix management programs in hospitals by Burns 
and Wholey (1993) also reported evidence for normative insti- 
tutional pressures. 
It is important to note that cohesion can generate isomor- 
phism for coercive and mimetic as well as normative rea- 
sons. In a seller-buyer relationship in which the latter has 
more bargaining power than the former, similarity in behavior 
is likely to be due to a coercive effect (DiMaggio and Powell, 
1983). Cohesive ties provide a channel for the transfer of 
information and tend to generate imitative behavior (Cole- 
man, Katz, and Menzel, 1957; Gulati and Gargiulo, 1999). 
Whether coercive, normative, or mimetic, the effect of iso- 
morphism is that cohesive actors or organizations tend to 
adopt similar patterns of behavior. 
The logic of cohesion can be readily extended to the phe- 
nomenon of cross-national diffusion. Intense trade relation- 
ships between pairs of countries produce cohesion, and 
firms in trade-cohesive countries are likely to have similar 
numbers of certificates because of the influence of similar 
customer requirements (a coercive effect; see Corbett, 
2002), the impact of shared patterns of behavior (a normative 
effect), and the attempts to cope with uncertainty through 
information and experience sharing, which results in imitation 
(a mimetic effect). Export and import ties between two coun- 
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tries exist as a result of micro-level interactions between 
firms and managers, which may result in the transfer of 
knowledge and experiences about organizational practices. 
Firms in country A should be influenced by the level of ISO 
adoption of firms in country B to the extent that A and B 
have strong, cohesive trade ties between them. Previous 
research confirms this idea in finding that U.S. and Canadian 
firms exporting to regions with a high number of certificates 
(e.g., Europe) tend to have more ISO certificates than other 
U.S. or Canadian firms (Anderson, Daly, and Johnson, 1999). 
Therefore, we hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 3 (H3): The greater the number of ISO 9000 certificates 
awarded to firms in countries with which the focal country is strong- 
ly related in terms of trade (i.e., cohesion), the greater the number 
of certificates in the focal country. 
Equivalence in networks as a source of learning and com- 
petitive mimicry. Imitation among members of a social sys- 
tem can also occur for competitive reasons (DiMaggio and 
Powell, 1983; Abrahamson and Rosenkopf, 1993; Haunschild 
and Miner, 1997). Competitive imitation pressures exist when 
firms learn from each other how to become better at what 
they do or when they mimic each other so as to minimize 
the competitive risk of losing a market or a source of supply. 
Firms may adopt the same practices because not doing so 
would disadvantage them relative to the competition and 
erode their edge in the marketplace. As the number of 
adopters increases, the pressure on non-adopters also rises, 
increasing rates of diffusion. 
The social network literature first conceptualized competitive 
imitation in terms of structural equivalence. In this view, two 
actors related to the same set of third parties are likely to 
exhibit similarity in behavior, regardless whether there are 
direct ties between them. The literature on contagion pro- 
vides some evidence for the effect of structural equivalence 
as a diffusion mechanism. For instance, Burt (1987) and 
Galaskiewicz and Burt (1991) found that structural equiva- 
lence between actors is a better predictor of the diffusion of 
certain practices or innovations than cohesion. 
The concept of structural equivalence, however, is open to 
two alternative interpretations (Mizruchi, 1992, 1993). On the 
one hand, structural equivalence may highlight competition 
between actors for the same resources and trigger imitation 
between actors who could substitute for each other in the 
social system (Burt, 1987). By analogy, countries occupying 
an equivalent structural position in the network of internation- 
al trade, by virtue of trading with the same set of third coun- 
tries, compete with each other for the same export markets 
or import sources and thus would be expected to exhibit a 
similar pattern of behavior. On the other hand, similar behav- 
ior by structurally equivalent actors may be attributed to the 
homogenizing effect of influences coming from a shared set 
of third-party ties, an interpretation first outlined by Simmel 
(1950: 145-169) in his analysis of dyadic and triadic relation- 
ships. This second view of structural equivalence highlights 
the fact that if two actors are connected to the same set of 
third parties, then they share a "common influence," with 
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cohesion between them "viewed as an outcome of common 
relations with other members of the system" (Mizruchi, 
1992: 45). Thus, shared third-party ties create a situation of 
"ecological influence": actors may behave similarly because 
they are influenced by the same set of third actors, i.e., they 
are indirectly cohesive. Common influence may include simi- 
lar economic circumstances, or normative implications, that 
cause parties to adopt similar behavioral patterns (Mizruchi, 
1993; Marsden and Friedkin, 1993; Shah, 1998). In the inter- 
national trade network, countries that export to a similar set 
of countries may be subject to a similar influence in terms of 
ISO 9000 certification. For instance, if ISO 9000 certification 
is widespread in country A, the firms in other countries that 
transact with country A but not among themselves are likely 
to feel a similar pressure toward certification. 
Because the concept of structural equivalence has alternative 
interpretations, we prefer to use the concept of role equiva- 
lence to capture the competitive aspects of mimicry. Two 
actors are said to be role equivalent to the extent that they 
have similar kinds of relationships with third parties (Winship 
and Mandel, 1983; Winship, 1988; Burt, 1990; Mizruchi, 
1993), whether relationships are based on advice, informa- 
tion, a desired input, money, socializing, or other factors. 
Actors that play similar roles in a social structure are likely to 
behave alike even if they are not cohesive (not linked to each 
other) or structurally equivalent (they do not relate to the 
same set of third parties). Such role-equivalent actors would 
exhibit similarity in behavior for competitive reasons because 
they are substitutes for each other in the social structure. 
Our approach to role equivalence is a modification of Winship 
and Mandel's (1983). Like them, we rely on the concept of 
the social role as defined by role relations and role sets (Mer- 
ton, 1968). A relation is a specific way in which two actors 
can interact, for instance, friendship or advice relations. A 
role set is the collection of all the different types of relations 
in which an actor engages. Since our unit of analysis is the 
country, we focus our theoretical argument on relations 
between countries. We define a relation as the export or 
import of a particular type of product and a role set as a 
country's total exports and imports by reference to each type 
of good, an approach pioneered by sociologists working in 
the world-system research tradition (Smith and White, 1992; 
Van Rossem, 1996; see also Koka, Prescott, and Madhavan, 
1999). Winship and Mandel further defined role equivalence 
using a nested pair of dyad-by-dyad distance measures but 
noted that other approaches are possible. We take advantage 
of one alternative they mention and define role equivalence 
as the overlap between two actors' role sets. Given this defi- 
nition, when countries A and B trade in the same products 
but with a different set of countries, they are role equivalent 
but may not be structurally equivalent. Conversely, countries 
may be structurally equivalent but not role equivalent if they 
trade in different types of products but with the same set of 
countries. 
Firms in countries A and B should be more likely to adopt 
similar patterns of behavior, including ISO 9000 certification, 
to the extent that A and B export or import the same types 
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of products. This argument is consistent with the emphasis 
in neoinstitutional research on isomorphic processes within 
industries (Fligstein, 1985; Haveman, 1993; Scott, 1995: 56). 
Role-equivalent countries operate in the same product mar- 
kets but not necessarily in the same geographical markets. 
Even when firms in country A and country B operate in differ- 
ent geographical markets, an increasing number of certifica- 
tions in country A will likely prompt firms in country B to pur- 
sue certification, for two mutually reinforcing reasons. First, 
firms in country B may learn from firms in country A how to 
make their products more attractive to their own customers. 
In fact, the literature on the multinational corporation has long 
emphasized that firms learn from others in their industry as 
they expand throughout the world (Vernon, 1979; Johanson 
and Vahlne, 1977), and recent empirical analyses have corrob- 
orated this idea (Henisz and Delios, 2001; Guillen, 2002). This 
learning argument also applies to imports, because firms or 
countries that need to secure from abroad the same product 
(i.e., they are role-equivalent in terms of imports) may learn 
from each other what is the best source or the best proce- 
dure to secure the needed input. 
The second reason for imitation based on role equivalence is 
the risk of a country's losing export markets or import 
sources to firms based in a competing country if its own 
firms do not keep up with the competing country's level of 
ISO 9000 certification. This argument is analogous to the idea 
that actors occupying equivalent positions in a social struc- 
ture (peers) tend to imitate each other so as to enhance their 
own performance. As Burt (1997: 345) noted, structural situa- 
tions in which an actor has "many peers create a competitive 
frame of reference." Competition invites the actor to be 
"tuned to peers' job performance." Therefore, we expect 
firms in role-equivalent countries to behave similarly because 
they learn from their industry peers how to become more 
effective at exporting or importing and because they wish to 
anticipate potential sources of competition in export or 
import markets. 
Hypothesis 4 (H4): The greater the number of ISO 9000 certificates 
awarded to firms in countries with which the focal country shares a 
common pattern of trade by product category (role equivalence), the 
greater the number of certificates in the focal country. 
It is important to reiterate that the three institutional mecha- 
nisms of coercive, normative, and mimetic isomorphism may 
operate simultaneously through the agency of the state, the 
multinationals, the knowledge-bearing professions, and/or 
because of contact diffusion through networks of ties linking 
adopters to potential adopters. For instance, we have elabo- 
rated above how cohesive trade ties might generate coer- 
cive, normative, and mimetic effects. Thus, while the three 
isomorphic effects can be distinguished conceptually, in 
empirical reality they may prove difficult to disentangle. 
DATA AND METHODS 
Dependent Variable 
We have compiled a cross-national and longitudinal data set 
of the number of ISO 9000 quality certificates between the 
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years 1992 and 1998 using an annual survey initiated by 
Mobil Corp. and then continued by ISO (ISO, 2001b). Unfortu- 
nately, the survey did not collect detailed information for earli- 
er years. One of the authors visited the ISO in Geneva to 
search for the annual breakdown of certificates in each coun- 
try prior to 1992, but these data did not exist. Given that the 
process of certification is highly decentralized, and many 
quality associations and commercial organizations are accred- 
ited to extend certificates, obtaining cross-national data on 
certification from any other source, especially for the early 
years, is extremely difficult. The reference month for the 
number of certificates was December of each year, except 
for 1992 (January 1993), 1993 (September), and for 1994 
(June), due to irregularities in the original survey (ISO, 
2001 b). Table 1 provides a sample of the data for 34 coun- 
tries, to illustrate the diversity in ISO certification across 
countries in 1993 and 1998. 
Explanatory Variables 
We obtained measures for the independent variables from 
other secondary data sources. To rule out the possibility of 
reverse causation, we measured all independent variables 
with a one-year lag, which effectively reduces our sample to 
Table 1 
Number of ISO 9000 Certificates, Selected Countries, 1993 and 1998 
Country Sept. 1993 Dec. 1998 
Algeria 0 2 
Argentina 9 807 
Australia 2695 14170 
Brazil 113 3712 
Cameroon 0 5 
Canada 530 7585 
China 35 8245 
Czech Republic 18 1443 
Equatorial Guinea 0 0 
France 1586 14194 
Germany 1534 24055 
Greece 46 764 
India 73 3344 
Israel 170 3700 
Italy 864 18095 
Japan 434 8613 
Kenya 0 416 
Netherlands 1502 10570 
New Zealand 489 2581 
Nigeria 0 20 
Peru 0 46 
Saudi Arabia 10 280 
Singapore 523 3000 
South Africa 1007 2166 
Spain 320 6412 
Sweden 365 3489 
Switzerland 569 6426 
Thailand 9 1236 
Tunisia 1 70 
Turkey 65 1607 
United Kingdom 28096 58963 
United States 2059 24987 
Venezuela 9 163 
Vietnam 0 29 
World total 46571 271847 
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the years 1993-1998. As independent variables had highly 
skewed distributions, they were entered into the analyses in 
logarithmic form. 
We included in the analysis two measures of resource 
dependence on powerful organizations. The role of the state 
in the economy was measured by general government con- 
sumption. One can argue that this variable includes many 
other expenses other than those incurred by the government 
as a buyer and hence is an imperfect measure. In particular, 
government expenditures in education, health, or welfare 
may not seem directly related to its coercive power as a 
buyer or contractor. While we acknowledge this limitation, 
we believe that a larger government presence in these areas 
still implies a larger base of transactions with commercial 
entities in the economy. Moreover, ISO 9000 standards have 
been applied in sectors such as healthcare and education as 
well as manufacturing (ISO, 2001a, 2001 b). Nevertheless, we 
calculated this measure in two alternative ways: first, by 
excluding public education spending and then by further 
excluding public health care spending. For the set of coun- 
tries for which these data are available, the two measures 
are very highly correlated with the original measure (.96 and 
.78, respectively). Given the high correlations and the missing 
data problems with the latter measures, we report results 
with the original measure, general government consumption, 
obtained from the CD-ROM of the World Bank's 1999 World 
Development Indicators. We measured the coercive effect of 
the presence of foreign multinationals by the value of inward 
foreign direct investment (FDI) stock, obtained from the Unit- 
ed Nations' World Investment Report for 1994-1999. Both 
government consumption and inward FDI were normalized 
by gross domestic product (GDP), to control for the size of 
each country's economy. 
We originally measured the country's technical knowledge 
base by the number of scientists, engineers, and technicians 
in each country, obtained from UNESCO's 1995 Statistical 
Yearbook, but this information was only available for a small 
sample of countries and for a limited number of years. There- 
fore, we employed a second measure of the shared knowl- 
edge base on quality practices. We counted the number of 
articles on "operations," "engineering," "manufacturing," 
and "quality" authored by residents of each country during 
each year using the Science Citation Index (SCI). Coauthored 
papers by residents in different countries were attributed to 
each of the countries. The number of articles published in 
academic, technical, and trade journals is an indicator of 
knowledge exchange and exposure among members of a 
community to a certain practice or idea. In a parallel applica- 
tion, Burns and Wholey (1993) measured the information 
transmission effects of network embeddedness on the adop- 
tion of matrix management by counting the number of 
reports of matrix management in health administration 
research and trade journals. Walgenbach and Beck (2000) and 
Cole (1985, 1989) tracked the institutionalization of the quali- 
ty management movement in various countries through publi- 
cations on quality management. The early awareness about 
total quality management was found to reach firms through 
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I 
We also calculated the measure without 
squaring the strength of trade ties. The 
correlation between the two measures 
was .69 (p < .001), and the regression 
results with one or the other measure 
were similar. 
2 
We used the U.S. Bureau of Economic 
Analysis industry classifications to catego- 
rize trade flows by industry, as provided 
in Feenstra (2000). 
magazine articles and media reports (Zbaracki, 1998). The 
correlation between the article count and the number of sci- 
entists, engineers, and technicians for the observations for 
which both variables were available was .58 (p < .001). To 
control for the size of the country, we normalized the article 
count by population. 
So as to approximate the effects of cohesive trade relation- 
ships, we developed a measure that captures how strongly a 
country is tied to other countries and the extent to which ISO 
9000 certificates have already diffused in those other coun- 
tries. In a network model of trade, the impact of direct ties 
on diffusion for a given country i can be captured by the 
strength of the trade ties between country i and all other 
countries (country i's trade with each country j as a propor- 
tion of country i's total trade), multiplied by the extent of dif- 
fusion of certificates in each country j. The cohesion effect is 
highest when a country has strong trade ties with other 
countries that have a large number of certificates as of the 
previous year. Given that those countries with which the 
focal country has strong ties may have a substantially higher 
impact than those with which the country has weak ties, we 
squared the strength of ties for each country before multiply- 
ing it by the number of certificates to account for the idea 
that stronger ties may have a larger impact than weaker 
ties.1 Formally, our measure of cohesion in trade for country i 
at time t is, 
Cohesion in Trade Effectit = j ISOjt1 x (Traradei/Trade)2 
where ISO.t-, is the number of certificates for country j at 
time t-1, Tradejt,1 is the total trade between country i and 
country j during year t-1, and Tradet_1 is country i's total trade 
during the same period. This measure is non-negative but 
has no upper bound, as the number of certificates in other 
countries can grow indefinitely. A simple numerical illustra- 
tion helps to make this point. If all of country A's trade is with 
just one other country, B, then its cohesion measure for a 
given year equals the number of certificates in country B as 
of the year before, which can range between zero and a very 
large number. If country A evenly divides its trade among one 
hundred other countries in the world, then the cohesion mea- 
sure would equal the sum of the number of certificates of 
the other 100 countries multiplied by .0001 (the square of 
1/100). 
To capture the effect of role equivalence in trade, we calcu- 
lated how much a country's pattern of exports and imports 
by product category overlaps with those of other countries, 
weighted by the extent to which ISO 9000 certifications have 
already diffused in each of the other countries. For each 
country i and year t, we constructed export and import indus- 
try share vectors. These indicate the share of industry k in 
country i's total exports (imports) during year t, for each of 
the 34 industry categories.2 Formally, the export and import 
industry share vectors (EISV and IISV, respectively) are 
defined as follows: 
221/ASQ, June 2002 
This content downloaded from 128.83.205.78 on Thu, 26 Feb 2015 20:23:01 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
EISVi = Exports,kt1/?k Exportsiktl 
3 
Correlation is generally more appropriate 
than Euclidian distance for measuring 
equivalence with continuous data 
because it automatically normalizes for 
mean and variance (Wasserman and 
Faust, 1994). 
4 
Only two countries, Equatorial Guinea 
(dropped because of missing data) and 
Kenya, actually had negative role equiva- 
lence scores. It is also possible, though 
extremely unlikely, for a country to have a 
measure of role equivalence exactly equal 
to zero. 
IlSVt = Importsikt _,/k Importsiktl 
where Exports,kt1 is the dollar value of exports from country i 
in industry k and year t-1, and Importsikt,1 is the dollar value 
of imports to country i in industry k and year t-1. Following 
Wasserman and Faust (1994), we stacked the export and 
import industry share vectors to form a single vector ISVt_1 
for each country i during year t-1. The correlation coefficient 
between the trade-by-industry vectors for two countries indi- 
cates the extent to which the two countries compete in the 
same industries, regardless of whom they trade with, i.e., 
the degree to which they are role equivalent.3 As with cohe- 
sion, we also multiplied role equivalence between countries i 
and j by the number of certificates in j as of the previous 
year. Thus, 
Role Equivalence in Trade Effect1t = Xj ISOjt_1 x r (ISVit 1, ISVjt 1) 
where ISOt 1 is the number of certificates held by country j 
in year t-1 and r is the Pearson correlation coefficient 
between the industry share vectors for countries i and j dur- 
ing year t-1. This measure is not bounded, and it can be neg- 
ative or positive depending on whether country i's trade-by- 
industry vector is, on balance, mostly negatively correlated 
with those of other countries or mostly positively correlated.4 
Our approach deviates from Winship and Mandel's (1983) in 
that we did not consider indirect relations and in that the role 
set is a sum of relations rather than merely a list of those 
present. The first change was made to eliminate the "com- 
mon influence" problem and the second to accommodate 
the longitudinal process of diffusion. We obtained the annual 
trade matrices used to calculate our measures of cohesion 
and role equivalence from Feenstra (2000). 
Control Variables 
We also included in all analyses several control variables: the 
size of the labor force as a measure of country size; GDP per 
capita as a measure of the level of economic development; 
membership in the EU to control for this institution's role in 
promoting ISO 9000 certification; outward foreign direct 
investment over GDP, to account for the extent to which 
each country's firms are internationally oriented; and a time 
trend. All of the above explanatory and control variables are 
time varying in nature and were obtained from the World 
Bank's 1999 World Development Indicators or the United 
Nations' World Investment Report for 1994-1999. Regres- 
sions also included the initial count of certificates as of the 
end of 1992 and country fixed effects to remove other 
sources of time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity, including 
cross-national differences in patterns of ISO adoption prior to 
the beginning of our observation period, technical require- 
ments, state administrative structures, or structural positions 
in the world-system of nation-states, which can be safely 
222/ASQ, June 2002 
This content downloaded from 128.83.205.78 on Thu, 26 Feb 2015 20:23:01 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Spread of ISO 9000 
5 
When compared with countries excluded 
from the sample due to missing data, our 
study includes countries with a signifi- 
cantly higher average GDP per capita than 
excluded countries ($9,511 compared 
with $6,284, p < .05). 
6 
We also calculated another measure that 
accounts for the role of the EU in the dif- 
fusion of certificates more specifically, 
obtained by multiplying the dichotomous 
membership in EU variable (0 or 1) by the 
average number of certificates in all other 
EU member countries as of the previous 
year. Because results are qualitatively 
similar to those reported with the EU 
membership variable, we report only the 
latter. The lack of significance of EU 
membership seems to detract from our 
argument about coercive isomorphism, 
although this result may be due to the 
methodological constraints mentioned. 
assumed to be fairly stable over a six-year period (Smith and 
White, 1992). 
Analysis 
Our dependent variable, the number of ISO 9000 certificates, 
has certain important characteristics: (1) it is non-negative; (2) 
it is integer-valued, denoting counts of certificates in each 
country every year; (3) it exhibits overdispersion, as observa- 
tions range from zero to thousands; and (4) it is longitudinal. 
When the outcome variable is non-negative and integer- 
valued, certain assumptions of the ordinary least squares 
(OLS) regression are violated, such as uncorrelated error 
terms and homoskedasticity (Berry, 1993). Therefore, the use 
of Poisson models of regression is more appropriate than 
OLS. When the data are overdispersed, the standard distribu- 
tion used is the negative binomial, i.e., the Poisson assump- 
tion of equal mean and variance is relaxed (Hausman, Hall, 
and Griliches, 1984; Cameron and Trivedi, 1998). 
We used fixed-effects negative binomial analysis and maxi- 
mum likelihood estimation on our data of countries pooled 
over the 1993-1998 period. Thus, our model measures the 
impact of a change in the independent variable on the rate of 
diffusion of ISO 9000 certificates from one year to the next. 
The final sample includes an unbalanced panel of 468 
country-year observations (85 countries, 6 years), after losing 
observations due to missing data on one or more of the 
explanatory or control variables. The countries in the sample 
account for 98 percent of the total number of certificates in 
the world, 96 percent of world GDP, and 94 percent of world 
trade as of 1998.5 
RESULTS 
Table 2 presents the sample statistics and correlation coeffi- 
cients. Regression results are reported in table 3. Model 1 
includes the control variables only. Not surprisingly, the size 
of the country, the level of economic development, and the 
time trend exerted significant effects on the number of cer- 
tificates. Membership in the EU, which is also time varying, 
did not reach significance, perhaps because our period of 
observation starts in 1993, when early adoption had already 
taken place, or because of high covariance with the country 
fixed effects.6 Outward foreign direct investment was not 
significant either, indicating that the international orientation 
of firms does not necessarily lead to certification. 
Our predictions about the effects of institutional variables 
received strong support that is robust to the number of 
explanatory variables included in the equation (models 2 
through 8 in table 3). Considering the full specification of 
model 8, we found strong support for hypothesis 1 about the 
coercive effect of resource dependence. The number of cer- 
tificates significantly increased with the presence of the state 
or of foreign multinationals in the economy, as measured by 
government consumption and inward foreign direct invest- 
ment, respectively. Hypothesis 2, on the normative effect of 
the availability of scientific and technical knowledge about 
operations, engineering, manufacturing, or quality, received 
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Table 2 
Sample Means and Correlations 
Variable Mean S.D. Min. Max. 1 2 3 
1. Number of certificates 1894.52 6209.72 0 58963 
2. Log (Gov. consumption/GDP) 2.67 .36 1.09 4.02 .16' 
3. Log (Inward foreign investment/GDP) 2.44 1.12 -3.81 4.34 .03 -.09 
4. Log (Tech. publications/Population) 4.03 5.66 -13.82 8.94 .20' .17' -.06 
5. Log (Cohesion in trade) 6.31 1.14 3.07 9.38 .02 .03 .16' 
6. Log (Role equivalence in trade) 10.27 .89 6.63 11.83 .19- .06 .04 
7. Log (Size of labor force) 15.67 1.62 11.80 20.42 .24 -.25' -.20' 
8. Log (GDP per capita) 8.28 1.50 5.03 10.70 .31' .36* -.01 
9. Log (Outward foreign investment/GDP) .60 2.46 -13.63 4.36 .25- .29' .14' 
10. Initial number of certificates/100 3.58 20.97 0 185.77 .88' .15' .06 
11. European Union membership .16 .37 0 1 .39* .27' .09 
Variable 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
5. Log (Cohesion in trade) .02 
6. Log (Role equivalence in trade) .27* .59- 
7. Log (Size of labor force) .199 -.20' .20' 
8. Log (GDP per capita) .54' .08 .22* -.17' 
9. Log (Outward foreign investment/GDP) .34' .16' .08 -. 15 .60* 
10. Initial number of certificates/ 00 .12* -.08 .01 .133 .18 .17' 
11. European Union membership .29* .10' .23' .06 .49' .30* .30* 
* p< .05. 
_ 
_~~~~~~~~~~~= 
7 
To test for the influence of structural 
equivalence on the number of ISO 9000 
certificates, we calculated a measure 
from the import and export matrix by 
country using UCINET. This measure is 
highly correlated with our cohesion mea- 
sure (.75, p < .001), and the results of the 
analyses substituting structural equiva- 
lence for cohesion are qualitatively similar 
to those reported below. This leads us to 
believe that structural equivalence cap- 
tures an indirect (or common influence) 
cohesion effect rather than a separate 
competitive effect on the diffusion of ISO 
9000 certificates (see Mizruchi, 1993, for 
an explanation of the two interpretations 
of structural equivalence). In light of these 
results, we decided to continue using our 
role equivalence measure. 
no support, whether other explanatory variables were in the 
equation or not (see models 4 and 8). 
The results also corroborated our predictions about the 
effects of trade networks on the diffusion of quality certifica- 
tion. Hypothesis 3, on the impact of cohesive trade relation- 
ships, received strong and robust support. Thus, the number 
of certificates significantly increased when the country was 
strongly tied in terms of trade to other countries with a high 
number of certificates as of the previous year. Finally, our 
results also provided strong and robust support for hypothe- 
sis 4, on the effect of role equivalence in trade: the number 
of certificates significantly increased when the country's 
trade distribution by industry overlapped with that of other 
countries with a high number of certificates as of the previ- 
ous year.7 Thus, we obtained support for three of our four 
hypotheses about the effects of institutional variables on the 
cross-national diffusion of ISO 9000 quality certification. 
The control variables in the full model behaved as reported 
above. The effect of the year time trend decreased in magni- 
tude and significance after cohesion and role equivalence 
were entered, which means that the increase in quality certi- 
fication from one year to the next is distributed across coun- 
tries in systematically different ways that operate through 
trade networks. When compared with the baseline model 
with the control variables and the fixed effects, the full model 
provided a significant improvement in goodness of fit (p < 
.001, following a chi-squared distribution with 5 degrees of 
freedom). 
We conducted three additional analyses to check for the 
robustness of the results presented in table 3 to changes in 
the estimation method. First, we estimated the number of 
certificates in each country with a fixed-effects Poisson 
regression model, although the assumption of equal mean 
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Table 3 
Fixed-Effects Negative Binomial Analysis of the Number of ISO 9000 Certificates, 1993-1998* 
Variable (hypothesis, sign) 1 2 3 4 
Government consumption (H1 +) .417' .4340 
(.201) (.202) 
Inward foreign investment (H1 +) .277'* 
(.071) 
Technical publications (H2 +) .019 
(.015) 
Cohesion in trade (H3 +) 
Role equivalence in trade (H4 +) 
Size of labor force .188i- .215m*" .275" .180" 
(.057) (.059) (.061) (.058) 
GDP per capita .545*" .545m" .646" .523- 
(.077) (.076) (.082) (.078) 
Outward foreign investment .001 -.008 -.041 -.002 
(.046) (.045) (.049) (.046) 
Initial number of certificates -.007- -.008" -.009- -.008' 
(.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) 
European Union membership -.002 -.033 -.099 -.005 
(.158) (.151) (.149) (.156) 
Year .465" 0.468" .440" .461 " 
(.018) (.018) (.018) (.018) 
Constant -50.801 " -52.571 " -52.379" -50.211 " 
(1.952) (2.115) (2.184) (2.005) 
Log likelihood -1861.626 -1859.382 -1851.403 -1860.741 
Variable (hypothesis, sign) 5 6 7 8 
Government consumption (H1 +) .463' 
(.200) 
Inward foreign investment (H1 +) .369" 
(.070) 
Technical publications (H2 +) .017 
(.014) 
Cohesion in trade (H3 +) .674" .672" .722" 
(.073) (.073) (.067) 
Role equivalence in trade (H4 +) .238- .163- .146" 
(.081) (.063) (.060) 
Size of labor force .345" .176- .327" .438" 
(0.059) (.059) (.061) (.065) 
GDP per capita .635- .485" .603" .71 1 
(.075) (.081) (.078) (.087) 
Outward foreign investment -.033 -.004 -.036 -.108 
(.048) (.047) (.049) (.056) 
Initial number of certificates -.008" -.008" -.009W -.01 2" 
(.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) 
European Union membership .082 .024 .085 -.049 
(.136) (.160) (.135) (.125) 
Year .164" .388" .112" .071 
(.034) (.032) (.039) (.037) 
Constant -29.324" -45.160-" -25.45" -26.424- 
(2.746) (2.818) (3.116) (3.167) 
Log likelihood -1828.455 -1857.007 -1824.926 -1806.103 
p < .05; - p < .01; - p < .001 
* Standard errors are in parentheses; all explanatory variables except the Initial number of certificates and Year are 
logged and measured using one-year lags; country fixed effects are included in all models. 
and variance does not hold in this sample. The coefficient 
estimates for the hypothesized effects follow the same pat- 
tern of significance reported above using the negative bino- 
mial model, except that technical publications became signifi- 
cant (p < .001). Not surprisingly, the overdispersion 
parameter x was significantly different from zero (31.62, with 
a standard error of 3.52), suggesting that the Poisson model 
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is not appropriate in this case. Second, we estimated the 
logged number of certificates, using OLS with country fixed 
effects. Coefficient estimates for inward foreign direct invest- 
ment and cohesion in trade were correctly signed and signifi- 
cant, consonant with the results obtained with negative bino- 
mial regression. The coefficient estimates for government 
consumption and role equivalence in trade were correctly 
signed but did not reach significance. This is likely due to the 
violation of key OLS assumptions. 
In the third robustness check, we analyzed our data using 
negative binomial regression with random effects instead of 
fixed effects. All the hypothesized effects reported in table 3 
held, and the point estimates were also very similar. More- 
over, the number of technical publications per capita was also 
positive and highly significant when using random effects. 
We suspect that the country fixed effects are capturing struc- 
tural differences across countries in the availability of techni- 
cal knowledge relevant to ISO 9000 that do not change much 
over a six-year period. Therefore, the fixed-effects model pro- 
vides a more conservative test of our hypotheses that yields 
results largely consistent with those obtained with other esti- 
mation methods. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
This paper contributes not only to the empirical literature on 
the worldwide diffusion of organizational practices, but also 
to organizational theory by extending the basic postulates of 
the new institutionalism to the study of international diffusion 
and isomorphism. In this view, the agency of powerful orga- 
nizations such as the state and foreign multinationals gener- 
ates coercive pressures for diffusion and isomorphism to the 
extent that potential adopters depend on them for resources. 
The availability of scientific and technical knowledge provides 
a normative template that may facilitate diffusion. Finally, 
mimetic isomorphism in the world occurs to the extent that 
cohesive ties between countries generate coercive or norma- 
tive imitation and role equivalent network positions increase 
learning and competition. Our paper is the first to apply the 
concept of role equivalence to capture the impact on diffu- 
sion of the extent to which countries-and hence firms- 
compete with each other in the global economy. Our argu- 
ment was that role-equivalent firms are likely to imitate each 
other's practices in order to boost their own performance. 
We proposed learning and anticipation of competition as the 
basic behavioral mechanisms underlying imitation among 
role-equivalent actors. This argument is consistent with the 
well-established view that the set of equivalent actors in a 
social structure provides a competitive frame of reference 
(Burt, 1997). 
Our empirical results provided strong and robust support for 
the coercive effects of powerful organizations, such as the 
state and the multinationals, for the coercive or normative 
imitation processes that result from cohesive trade ties 
between countries, and for the competition-based mimicry 
that is generated by role equivalence in trade. Our analysis, 
however, provided no robust evidence for the independent 
impact of knowledge-based normative isomorphism as mea- 
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sured by scientific and technical publications in the areas of 
operations, engineering, manufacturing, or quality. The 
absence of supporting evidence on the normative effect of 
knowledge on isomorphism invites more research using alter- 
native indicators at various levels of analysis to see if the 
results reported in this paper are affected by the validity of 
our indicator of knowledge or by measurement error. Future 
research could develop alternative indicators of knowledge- 
based normative effects, perhaps even measure them for 
country dyads. Another possibility is to measure flows of 
technical personnel between countries. These data, however, 
are not readily available for a large number of countries and 
over time. 
An important corollary of our research is that the trade and 
foreign investment policies of countries have a significant 
influence on organizations because they affect the rate at 
which practices are adopted. The field of organization studies 
has downplayed international variables such as the position 
of countries in trade networks. The approach and findings 
reported in this paper may act as a reminder that, in an age 
of globalization, institutional context needs to be defined and 
measured internationally. Future research may further investi- 
gate the effect of the international context by specifying how 
certain attributes of states may be more likely to create coer- 
cive, normative, or mimetic pressures toward the diffusion of 
practices. For example, Murtha and Lenway (1994) have 
argued that the role of the state in the strategy and perfor- 
mance of firms depends on several attributes of the state, 
including domestic political institutions, the impact of ideolo- 
gy and domestic interest groups, and trade and foreign poli- 
cies. 
Our finding that the diffusion of certificates across countries 
is strongly influenced by how countries relate to each other 
in the global trading system is in line with the work of net- 
work theorists, who argue that the contagion of innovations 
occurs through imitation among actors in the same network 
(e.g., Burt, 1987, 1997; Abrahamson and Rosenkopf, 1997). 
While the importance of imitation among network members 
in the diffusion of practices has often been shown at the 
interpersonal and interorganizational levels, our study showed 
support for a similar mechanism operating at the international 
level. 
Our approach and findings run against the conventional wis- 
dom that globalization is an inexorable, uniform, and homoge- 
nous process tending toward unmitigated isomorphism 
across countries, at least in the adoption of organizational 
practices. Discernible cross-national patterns in rates of diffu- 
sion exist, and they shed light on the forces driving the 
process. Our results indicated that organizational practices 
diffuse across the world in contingent ways, depending on 
the extent to which firms in each country are exposed to 
coercive, normative, and mimetic effects, a finding consistent 
with recent social science work arguing that globalization is a 
complex process affecting organizations and countries in dif- 
ferent ways and to different degrees (e.g., Gereffi, 1993; 
Guidry, Kennedy, and Zald, 2000; Guillen, 2001). These find- 
ings provide impetus to the study of the diffusion of organiza- 
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tional practices in the global economy as a process shaped 
by the characteristics of countries and by their position in 
global networks, rather than as a process overdetermined by 
the supposedly sweeping effects of globalization. 
We recognize that our study is limited in several ways. First, 
missing data forced us to drop a number of countries from 
the analysis. Still, our final sample accounts for 98 percent of 
all ISO 9000 quality certificates, and for about 95 percent of 
world GDP and trade. Second, our panel includes only six 
years of data, which prevents us from observing the process 
of ISO 9000 diffusion since its inception in 1987. In particular, 
this limitation made it difficult for us to differentiate between 
early and late adoption patterns. Because our analyses per- 
tain only to later adoption of ISO 9000 certificates, it may be 
that some of the institutional factors that we find important 
to the diffusion process do not operate during the early stage 
of diffusion (see Tolbert and Zucker, 1983; Westphal, Gulati, 
and Shortell, 1997). 
A second limitation is that our data did not allow for an analy- 
sis of different applications of ISO 9000 standards. Institu- 
tional theorists have argued that practices adopted to ensure 
institutional legitimacy may be "decoupled" from the techni- 
cal activities of the organization and exist only on a symbolic 
basis (Meyer and Rowan, 1977), Empirical research has also 
shown that institutionalized forms of a practice may be differ- 
ent from its original, technical form (Westphal, Gulati, and 
Shortell, 1997; Zbaracki, 1998). This may be the case for the 
adoption of ISO 9000 standards, especially considering the 
decentralized process of certification in each country. Our 
claims are limited to the diffusion of certificates, rather than 
applying to the implementation of actual quality practices. 
This decoupling process may also be a reason why we found 
no significant effect for the technical knowledge base in a 
sample that does not cover the early stages of diffusion. 
Third, our empirical measures may be simultaneously captur- 
ing the effects of the different institutional mechanisms of 
coercive, normative, and mimetic isomorphism. States, for- 
eign multinationals, and network ties may facilitate diffusion 
through multiple channels, but it is difficult to disentangle 
them empirically. Finally, the adoption of certificates depends 
on many industry and organizational factors, which undoubt- 
edly play a role in a firm's decision to get certified. Unfortu- 
nately, our analysis cannot speak to those effects because of 
the level of aggregation at which the data are available. Still, 
we were able to test predictions based on neoinstitutional 
theory and to advance our understanding as to the coercive, 
normative, and mimetic drivers of cross-national diffusion. 
The fact that we included country fixed effects in all of our 
regressions removes industry composition or other country- 
level effects that are mostly invariant over such a short peri- 
od of time as six years. These limitations provide the oppor- 
tunity for future theoretical and empirical research on this 
topic. 
While globalization is a powerful isomorphic force in the 
world, it operates within the constraints and channels creat- 
ed by institutions. Our findings highlight that the diffusion of 
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practices in the global economy is shaped by the activities of 
such large organizations as the state and multinational firms 
and that cross-national isomorphism follows trade relation- 
ships, especially cohesive ones. These results have implica- 
tions for both governments and organizations. Governments 
can affect rates of diffusion of innovative practices not only 
as purchasers of goods and services, but also through trade 
policy. In the global economy, organizations wishing to adopt 
the most innovative practices should look to the state, multi- 
national firms, and their foreign trade partners and competi- 
tors for new models and opportunities. 
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